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TO COMMUNITY-MAKING PLACES 
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INTRODUCTION 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the polestar in con-
stitutional takings analysis, was apparently written in one weekend.1  In the 
almost thirty years since the Penn Central decision, the case has come to 
stand for the proposition that historic preservation ordinances are immune 
from takings challenges.2  Implicit in Justice William Brennan’s majority 
opinion, however hastily written it may have been, is the idea that the 
community—the public at large—may have some sort of right or interest in 
historic properties.3  Certainly takings analysis is ultimately a question of 
the rights of the title-holder.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution prohibit the states and the federal government 
from depriving persons of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law or from taking private property for public use without just compensa-
tion.4  In the historical preservation law context, the argument has been 
made that preservation laws are an unconstitutional taking of the title-
 
 * Editor-in-Chief, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 18.  J.D., 
2016 University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to the Volume 17, 18, and 19 Boards of 
Editors of the Journal for their camaraderie, friendship, guidance, and constant commitment to 
excellence.  All remaining errors are my own. 
 1 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see Transcript, Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the 
Supreme Court Litigators, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 287, 302 (2004) (“[The opinion] came 
together and was basically written Memorial Day weekend in three consecutive near all-
nighters.”). 
 2 For more thorough treatments of the takings implications of Penn Central, see Steven J. Eagle, 
Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2014); see also Daniel T. 
Cavarello, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: The Rise to Immunity of Historic Preser-
vation Designation from Successful Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 593 
(1995). 
 3 Generally, the term “historic properties” is used to describe broadly those structures that are sig-
nificant for historical, architectural, cultural, archeological, educational, or aesthetic considera-
tions. See also, 438 U.S. at 108 (1978) (“Not only do these buildings and their workmanship rep-
resent the lessons of the past and embody precious features of our heritage, they serve as 
examples of quality for today.”). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122 (citing Chica-
go, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)) (clarifying that the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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holder’s property, in that the title-holder can no longer do what she sees fit 
with the property, for example, build a thirty-story tower on top of a histor-
ically and aesthetically significant rail terminal.5  The property interest that 
the title-holder has, and the potential Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns therein,  are readily apparent. 
However, as Justice William Rehnquist said in his dissent in Penn Cen-
tral, “property” is not used in the Constitution in the  
vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the cit-
izen exercises rights recognized by law. . . . [Instead it refers to] the group of 
rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing . . . . The constitu-
tional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess.6   
Clearly, the title-holder has an interest in the property in question. Howev-
er, the community surrounding the property also has a “relation to the phys-
ical thing” and at least some “sort of interest” in these community-making 
places.  Too often, when discussing historic preservation law—and Penn 
Central in particular—the conversation jumps straight to the takings ques-
tion without addressing the underlying premise.  There is an incredible 
public interest in preserving and maintaining the historic buildings that an-
chor communities, and if the community members have some sort of prop-
erty interest in these community-making properties, then there may be 
some sort of due process right to the community that is currently on the 
back-burner. 
In any given neighborhood, members of the community may have some 
sort of interest in the preservation and maintenance of their historic struc-
tures.  These are the structures that give a place its distinct character.  In 
many ways, this is exactly the sort of right that arises out of “the citizen’s 
relation to the physical thing”7—in this case, a building.  Nowhere is this 
relationship between community and building more clear than in the case 
of churches.  For example, in March of 2015, it seemed like it was the end 
for St. Laurentius Church in the Fishtown neighborhood of Philadelphia.8  
Parish churches have long been centers of community.  Much more than a 
place where congregants gather on Sunday morning, the parish church is a 
symbol of the neighborhood itself, an identifying characteristic for parish-
 
 5 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 119 (“Instead, appellants filed suit . . . claiming, inter alia, that the 
application of the Landmarks Preservation Law had ‘taken’ their property without just compen-
sation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them of their 
property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 6 Id. at 142–43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 377–78 (1945)) (first emphasis omitted).  
 7 Id. at 142 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). 
 8 David O’Reilly, St. Laurentius, Beloved Polish Church in Fishtown, to Be Demolished,  PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Mar. 3, 2015, 1:08 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20150323_St__ 
  Laurentius_church_in_Fishtown__first_for_city_s_Polish_residents__to_be_demolished.html. 
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ioners and lay neighbors alike.  At what seemed like the end for St. Lauren-
tius, some anonymous community member left a sign among the flowers 
on the steps of the church.  In crude lettering on a piece of cardboard, one 
community member wrote a desperate plea and taped it to the church door: 
“Save our Church!”9  Though temporarily saved from the wrecking ball by 
historic designation in July of 2015, the future of St. Laurentius is by no 
means secure.10  It is also not alone on the endangered buildings list11; the 
City of Philadelphia has a rich history of destroying not only its churches 
but other centers of community as well.12  Communities are losing land-
marks for the sake of progress and as a result are losing community identi-
ty. 
Since the early-1980s, scholarship on the law of historic preservation 
has focused on three rationales for legally protecting and preserving histor-
ic places: (1) the idea that historic preservation should seek to inspire the 
observer with a sense of patriotism; (2) the idea that there is a cultural, ar-
tistic, or architectural importance of a building worth preserving; and (3) 
the idea that there is a concern for the environmental and psychological ef-
fects and the sense of place created by historic buildings.13  Professor Rose 
concludes that the new direction in historic preservation law is community 
based and that substantively and procedurally the community needs to be 
considered in decision-making regarding historic properties.14  This Com-
ment seeks to take that notion a step further and bring Justice Brennan’s 
 
 9 Ronnie Polaneczky, The Great Church Smackdown: Saving St. Laurentius, PHILA. DAILY NEWS 
(May 6, 2015, 3:01 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/ronnie_polaneczky/20150506 
  _The_great_church_smackdown__Saving_St__Laurentius.html. 
 10 Inga Saffron, For Now, St. Laurentius Is Safe from Destruction, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (July 
10, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20150711_For_now__ 
  Fishtown_s_St__Laurentius_Catholic_Church_is_historic_and_safe_from_destruction.html. 
 11 See Places to Save!, PRES. ALL. FOR GREATER PHILA., http://www.preservationalliance.com/
advocacy-in-action/places-to-save/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017), for a list of endangered properties 
in Philadelphia. 
 12 Each year, Hidden City Philadelphia publishes a list of the most notable lost buildings of that 
year. See, e.g., Bradley Maule, Lost Buildings of 2015, HIDDEN CITY PHILA. (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://hiddencityphila.org/2016/01/lost-buildings-of-2015/.  For 2015, Hidden City listed Pilgrim 
Congregational Church, the Levy-Leas Mansion, Girard Square, Philadelphia International Rec-
ords, New Hope Temple Baptist Church, Tourison’s Hall, The Old Medical School Building at 
Temple University, Barton Hall at Temple University, University City High School, and of 
course, the Boyd Theatre.  Id.  Oscar Beisert, author of numerous applications for the Philadelph-
ia Register of Historic Places, was recently quoted as saying “it couldn’t get any worse.  We are 
at the threshold of Hell.”  Samuel Lieberman, This Philly Transplant Is Struggling to Save Our 
Old Buildings: “We Are at the Threshold of Hell”, BILLY PENN (July 23, 2015, 8:30 AM), 
http://billypenn.com/2015/07/23/this-philly-transplant-is-struggling-to-save-our-citys-old-
buildings-we-are-at-the-threshold-of-hell/. 
 13 Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preserva-
tion, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 479–80 (1981). 
 14 Id. at 479, 491–92. 
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implicit premise in the Penn Central decision, that the community has 
some sort of property right in historic buildings, to the forefront.  Part I ex-
plores the aftermath of Penn Central and the current state of historic 
preservation law, describes the relationship between the community mem-
bers and the physical thing that is so important to property rights, as well as 
outlines the current failures and problems with so-called takings immunity.  
Part II looks at elements of Supreme Court jurisprudence outside of the 
Penn Central context that support a property right in historic properties. It 
then melds those cases with the idea that the public has some sort of inter-
est in historic properties to form a right to community and place-making 
that gives the general public due process considerations in the historic 
buildings that make their places their own.  Part III then explores standing 
in historic preservation cases and argues that the inconsistency in the appli-
cation of standing doctrine to these cases supports the idea that courts are 
increasingly contemplating a proprietary interest in community-making 
places.  Ultimately, it likely proves unworkable to recognize some sort of 
ownership right of the general community in historic places.  It is, however, 
important to note that there are property interests at play in our physical 
space that are not limited to the legal title-holder and, as Justice Rehnquist 
explained, we must recognize “every sort of interest.”15 
I.  HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW AND THE PERSON’S RELATION TO THE 
THING 
The 2015 Nomination application for the Philadelphia Register of His-
toric Places says that St. Laurentius in Fishtown is an “established and fa-
miliar visual feature of the neighborhood and its larger community.  Fur-
thermore, St. Laurentius Church is a symbol of the cultural, economic, so-
social, and historical heritage of the Polish-immigrant and Polish-American 
population of the City of Philadelphia, as well as being part of the devel-
opment of the neighborhood itself.”16  This particular application for 
recognition as a historic place is emblematic of both the current state of 
preservation laws and the significance of buildings to the communities 
around them.  First, listing on a registry is incredibly important to preserva-
tion today.17  Second, the title-holder may not be the person with the largest 
 
 15 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 143 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945)). 
 16 Oscar Breisert & John Christian Bullit LaRue, Nomination of St. Laurentius Roman Catholic 
Church, Phila. Register of Historic Places, Phila. Historical Comm’n, 24 (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.phila.gov/historical/Documents/St%20Laurentius%20Interior%
20nomination%20FINAL.pdf. 
 17 See generally SARAH C. BRONIN & J. PETER BYRNE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 57–73 
(2012). 
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stake in preserving the building.  In this Part, I outline broadly the current 
state of historic preservation law, including the takings immunity that came 
out of Penn Central.  I then discuss the relationship between the public and 
landmarks that could be called “community-making” and the potential in-
terests the public has in those buildings outside of the legal context.  Final-
ly, this Part concludes by discussing some of the problems with current his-
toric preservation law and its conceptions, most notably, that buildings still 
come down at an alarming rate and the focus on the title-holder as the dom-
inant party in any litigation. 
A.  Penn Central and Takings Immunity 
Since at least the mid-1990s, the pervading wisdom has been that his-
toric preservation laws are immune to Takings Clause challenges.18  In 
1978, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, in which it held that the New York 
City Landmarks Law did not constitute an unconstitutional “taking.”19 
Penn Central Transportation Co. wanted to construct a large office tow-
er on top of Grand Central Terminal in New York City.20  After the de-
struction of the old Penn Station, a masterpiece of the Beaux-Arts style de-
signed by McKim, Mead, and White, in the early twentieth century,21 in 
1963, New York City passed a landmarks preservation law22 to protect his-
toric buildings from the wrecking ball.23  The Landmarks Preservation 
Commission, a body created out of the landmarks preservation law, denied 
Penn Central’s request to build the tower on top of Grand Central Terminal, 
itself a masterpiece of Beaux-Arts design from the same period as the old 
Penn Station.24  Given that the Commission had denied the request to con-
struct the office tower on top of the station, Penn Central filed a lawsuit 
against the City of New York arguing that the denial of the proposal to 
 
 18 See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE 
CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 314 (1999) (“Landmark preservation largely has 
withstood takings challenges. . . . Heavily influenced by Penn Central, state courts have been 
similarly inclined to spurn such takings claims.”); see also Cavarello, supra note 2, at 594 (“Fi-
nally, Section VII analyzes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s sudden reversal of opinion in the 
second United Artists’ decision and argues that such reversal demonstrates the proposition that 
historic preservation laws have become immune from constitutional takings challenges.”). 
 19 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138. 
 20 Id. at 116. 
 21 For a fantastic discussion of the rise and fall of Penn Station and the beginning of the historic 
preservation movement, see American Experience: The Rise and Fall of Penn Station (PBS tele-
vision broadcast Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/penn/. 
 22 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 25-301 (West 2016). 
 23 See Carol Clark, Albert S. Bard and the Origin of Historic Preservation in New York State, 18 
WIDENER L. REV. 323 (2012). 
 24 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 110, 116–18. 
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build the office tower under the New York City Landmarks Law was an 
unconstitutional taking, as it had deprived Penn Central Railroad of the 
economic value of the tower.25 
In the now-famous 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the New 
York Landmarks Law was constitutional and that the denial of the proposal 
was not an unconstitutional taking.26  Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
jority, articulated a balancing test for determining the constitutionality of a 
taking.27  Ultimately, this meant that takings challenges to Historic Preser-
vation Laws in other states were no longer successful.28  The takings impli-
cations of Penn Central have been discussed ad nauseum by scholars since 
that time.29 
One notable exception was in the State of Pennsylvania, where the 
Boyd Theater litigation challenged the idea that historic preservation laws 
were immune from takings challenges.30  The Boyd Theater was one of the 
last remaining grand movie palaces in the City of Philadelphia.31  It was a 
designated historic building.32  The owners of the theater challenged this 
designation as an unconstitutional taking.33  In United Artists’ I, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the designation without the consent of the 
property owners was “unfair, unjust, and amount[ed] to an unconstitutional 
taking without just compensation in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.”34  Then in 1993, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed its own ruling and concluded that “the designation of a pri-
 
 25 Id. at 119–20. 
 26 Id. at 138. 
 27 Id. at 124 (“The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, 
relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of the governmental action.”) (citation omitted); 
see also Cavarello, supra note 2, at 605 (“The three factors to be considered are: 1) the economic 
impact of the law on the claimant; 2) the extent to which the law has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations; and 3) the character of the governmental action.”). 
 28 See United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia (United Artists’ II), 635 A.2d 
612, 619 (Pa. 1993) (noting that in the fifteen years since the Penn Central decision, no state had 
broken with the decision except Pennsylvania). 
 29 See Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the 
Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) 
(“[T]he Penn Central formulation . . . has dominated discussion of takings law for a quarter of a 
century and continues to serve as the canonical standard for regulatory takings analysis . . . .”). 
 30 United Artists’ II, 635 A.2d at 614; United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., v. City of Philadelphia 
(United Artists’ I ), 595 A.2d 6, 7 (Pa. 1991). 
 31 See Inga Saffron, Changing Skyline: iPic Didn’t Come, So Now What for the Boyd?, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Dec. 19, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://articles.philly.com/2014-12-20/entertainment/ 
  57237635_1_boyd-theatre-ipic-live-nation (“So what happens to the Boyd, which opened in 
1928 and is the city’s lone survivor of Hollywood’s golden age?”). 
 32 United Artists’ I, 595 A.2d at 7. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 13–14. 
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vately owned building as historic without the consent of the owner is not a 
taking under the Constitution of [the] Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania].”35  
With that, Pennsylvania became the last state to make historic preservation 
designation immune from takings challenges.36  What is particularly inter-
esting about the United Artists’ I and II decisions, and the abrupt reversal 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is the subversion of the importance of 
the consent of the owner.  In United Artists I, it was the lack of title-holder 
consent that moved the court to find an unconstitutional taking.  Two years 
later, there were other considerations in play.  The protections of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution were found to no longer give such priority to the title-
holder and, indeed, the court recognized the importance of historic proper-
ties to the “health, prosperity and welfare of the people of Philadelphia.”37 
B.  The Due Process Rights Implicit in Penn Central 
In his majority opinion affirming the New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Justice Brennan rarely actually mentions the lower court’s decision.38  
The majority opinion, perhaps rightfully, jumps quickly from the procedur-
al history of the case into the takings analysis that results in the now-
famous balancing test.39  It is, however, important to note that in the broad-
er context, both the New York Court of Appeals opinion and Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion, to a lesser extent, operate with the underlying premise that 
there is some sort of interest that the public has in maintaining and preserv-
ing historic places. 
Chief Judge Charles Breitel, in his opinion for the New York Court of 
Appeals, strongly suggested that the public has some sort of ownership 
right in the historic properties.40  Judge Breitel’s argument was partially 
premised on the idea that this was not an impermissible taking because so 
much of the value of Grand Central Terminal was created by the public.  
He wrote: “Grand Central Terminal is no ordinary landmark. . . . Without 
people Grand Central would never have been a successful railroad terminal, 
and without the terminal, a major transportation center, the proposed build-
ing site would be much less desirable for an office building.”41  He went on 
 
 35 United Artists’ II, 635 A.2d at 620. 
 36 Id. at 619 (“The fact that no other state has broken with the Penn Central decision is not disposi-
tive of the matter, but it is persuasive. . . . [I]n [the] fifteen years since Penn Central, no other 
state has rejected the notion that no taking occurs when a state designates a building as histor-
ic.”). 
 37 Id. at 620 (emphasis added) (quoting PHILA., PA., ZONING CODE §14-2007(1)(a)).  
 38 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 120–22, 129 n.26, 132 n.28 (1978). 
 39 Id. at 122. 
 40 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977). 
 41 Id. at 1275. 
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further to say that “[o]f primary significance, however, is that society as an 
organized entity, especially through its government, rather than as a mere 
conglomerate of individuals, has created much of the value of the terminal 
property.”42  Judge Breitel concluded by emphasizing again the importance 
of the historic landmarks:  
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks . . . might be de-
sirable, or even required.  But when a less expensive alternative is available, 
especially when a city is in financial distress, it should not be forced to choose 
between witnessing the demolition of its glorious past and mortgaging its hopes 
for the future.43 
Chief Judge Breitel explicitly says that there are considerations at play here 
greater than economics.  Further, the focus on the city being able to choose 
whether to sit passively by and “witness the demolition of its glorious past” 
or actively preserve the buildings shows that there is an ownership interest 
in these properties that supersedes that of the title-holder.44  There are those 
that are able to make decisions that are not the “owner” in traditional par-
lance. 
Justice Brennan, for his part, in the majority opinion glosses over the 
reasons for historic preservation, almost as if they are a given.45  He wrote 
that all fifty states and a number of municipalities have enacted preserva-
tion laws for two purposes: (1) “in recent years, large numbers of historic 
structures, landmarks and areas have been destroyed without adequate con-
sideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility of pre-
serving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive 
ways,”46 and (2) the “widely shared belief that structures with special his-
toric, cultural, or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for 
all. . . .[These buildings] embody precious features of our heritage.”47  With 
that statement of purpose, Justice Brennan moved on to the takings analy-
sis.48 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1278. 
 44 Id. (emphasis added). 
 45 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 109 (1978). 
 46 Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted). 
 47 Id. (emphasis added). 
 48 The City of New York’s brief and the amicus briefs of the parties supporting the city have simi-
lar undertones that support the idea that preservation is for the benefit of the public at large and 
that there are considerations that supersede the rights of the individual property owner.  See, e.g., 
Appellees’ Brief at 8, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206883, at *6 
(“This heightened recognition of the public interest in the value of man's handiwork, particularly 
in urban areas, has resulted in legislation, at all levels of government, aimed at preserving our 
historical and cultural heritage.”); Motion for Leave to File and Brief of the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 3, 5, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 
104  (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206889, at *6–7 (noting that “historic preservation . . . of 
older buildings whose aesthetic or historic merit significantly contributes . . . to the maintenance 
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Further, as Robert Levy and William Mellor note in their book, The 
Dirty Dozen, the math does not make sense in the takings analysis in Penn 
Central.49  Justice Brennan must have had something else underlying the 
desire to deny Penn Central’s argument that this was an impermissible tak-
ing. 
C.  Survey of Historic Preservation Legislation 
It is useful to look to the current state of historic preservation law on the 
legislative side of government and determine what legislative bodies have 
intended with these laws.  The Takings Clause is implicated in Historic 
Preservation Law only because individual property owners have challenged 
regulations as impermissible takings.50  So what laws are being challenged? 
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (“NHPA”) is the most 
important of the Historic Preservation Laws.51  During the debate on what 
has come to be known as the National Historic Preservation Act, on July 
11, 1966, Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas said, “[a]nyone who has 
seen some of our modern urban renewal projects . . . knows that we have 
not discovered how to build variety into a planned project.  There is a de-
pressing sameness about it all.  We must not allow ourselves to be victim-
ized by monolithic exteriors.”52  The Act was clearly conceived to protect 
 
of American cities and towns as livable places [] has become a matter of great public interest,” 
and that “Grand Central Terminal is an important and irreplaceable component of the special 
uniqueness of New York City” as “the image of its facade symbolizes New York City for mil-
lions of visitors and residents”) (quoting Penn Cent., 50 A.D.2d 265, 269 (1975)); Brief of the 
State of New York, Amicus Curiae at 8, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 
WL 206891, at *5 (“Today . . . Grand Central remains a splended edifice and a major part of the 
cultural and architectural heritage of the City of New York.”). 
 49 ROBERT A. LEVY & WILLIAM MELLOR, THE DIRTY DOZEN: HOW TWELVE SUPREME COURT 
CASES RADICALLY CHANGED THE SUPREME COURT AND ERODED FREEDOM 175 (2008) (“In ef-
fect, the Court said, ‘Sure, you lost $150 million, but look at all the things the government let you 
keep!’  Apparently, in the Court’s view, $150 million was small change when one considers that 
Penn Central was allowed ‘to use the property precisely as it [had] been used for the past 65 
years . . . .’”) (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136). 
 50 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 424 (1982) (“[Appel-
lant] brought a class action against Teleprompter . . . on behalf of all owners of real property in 
the State on which Teleprompter has placed CATV components, alleging that Teleprompter’s in-
stallation was a . . . taking without just compensation.”); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107 (“[W]e 
must decide whether the application of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law to the par-
cel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal has ‘taken’ its owners’ property in violation of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia 
(Cathedral Mansions), 198 F.3d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Mayor of the District of Co-
lumbia denied District Intown’s request for construction permits . . . finding that the construction 
was incompatible with the property’s landmark status.  Alleging that the District of Columbia’s 
denial constituted a taking, District Intown and its general partners sued . . . .”). 
 51 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101-307108 (2014). 
 52 112 CONG. REC. 15,168 (1966) (statement of Sen. Yarborough). 
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the public.  In practice, the primary mechanism by which the NHPA pro-
tects historic structures is Section 106.53  Under Section 106, when there is 
a federal undertaking that effects a historical property, federal agencies 
must “take into account the effect of the undertaking” on any site listed in 
the National Register or eligible for listing.54  Generally, if the Section 106 
process is successful, a memorandum of agreement is written between the 
federal agency and the local historic preservation organization.55 
D.  The Public’s Relation to Buildings and Historic Places—Place-making 
with Buildings 
If we take Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of property rights in his Penn 
Central dissent to heart—that we must take into account “every sort of in-
terest that the citizen may possess,”56 including the group of rights “inher-
ing in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing”57— then it is critically 
important, in the historic preservation context, to consider the interests citi-
zens may have in the buildings that make up the built environment of their 
community and the relationships individuals have with those buildings. 
As Carol Rose noted in her article, Preservation and Community: New 
Directions in Historic Preservation Law, “the saga of shattered neighbor-
hoods [moved] architects and urbanologists to reconsider the political rami-
fications of the physical environment.”58 
The structures that make up a neighborhood, the community-making 
buildings, have an enormous effect on the community.59  Kevin Lynch dis-
tilled the importance of buildings in his 1960 book, The Image of the City, 
as the sense of not feeling “lost.”60  Indeed, the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act’s statement of purpose includes the desire to provide a “sense of 
 
 53 See Protection of Historic Properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2000) (implementing a complex scheme 
through which federal agencies are to comply with the statutory provisions of Section 106). 
 54 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2014). 
 55 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(b)–(c) (2000).  It is important to note the role that the public at large plays in 
most historic preservation legislation.  See THOMAS F. KING, FEDERAL PLANNING AND HISTORIC 
PLACES: THE SECTION 106 PROCESS 31–32 (2000) (concluding that “[t]he public, whose mem-
bers are to be kept informed of the undertaking and the process of Section 106 review and given 
opportunities to provide input and otherwise participate,” is a party to the Section 106 process, 
noting that “[c]learly, the definition of parties embraces just about everyone, as I, for one, think it 
should”). 
 56 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142–43 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945)). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Rose, supra note 13, at 488. 
 59 See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (discuss-
ing the importance of structures to community life); OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: 
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN (1972) (discussing the effect of architecture on 
crime rates in urban areas). 
 60 KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY 4 (1960). 
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orientation to the American people.”61  Neighborhoods and communities 
are lost without the historic structures that have made them communities. 
The Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. was for years the site of conflict 
between developers and preservationists.62  In one congressional oversight 
hearing, a Park Service representative was asked why the Willard Hotel 
was historic.  He responded:  
[A] lot of things make things historic. It is anything that gives a place a sense of 
place. . . . And if we keep tearing down everything which gives the city a sense 
of identity, and putting up duplicates of commercial glass boxes . . . how do 
you know where you are?63   
Justice Brennan articulated this theme, albeit more mildly, in his Penn Cen-
tral opinion: “[S]tructures with special historic, cultural, or architectural 
significance enhance the quality of life for all.”64 
Finally, from the very beginning, the ownership interest of the public 
was considered by those involved in the preservation movement. In With 
Heritage So Rich, a compilation of essays and reports that was pulled to-
gether to advocate for the passage of the National Historic Preservation 
Act, the Historic Preservation Committee wrote: 
[The preservation movement] must be more than a cult of antiquarians . . . . It 
must attempt to give a sense of orientation to our society, using structures and 
objects of the past to establish values of time and place. 
. . . . 
. . . [P]reservation must look beyond the individual building and individual 
landmark and concern itself with the historic and architecturally valued areas 
and districts which contain a special meaning for the community.65 
Is it workable to say that the general public should be some sort of qua-
si-title-holder of historic properties?  Of course not.  It is, however, incred-
ibly important to note the rich history of recognizing the value of commu-
nity-making structures to the general public and to recognize that there is, 
 
 61 Nat’l Historic Pres. Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 1, 80 Stat. 915, as amended by Pub. L. 
No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987 (1980). 
 62 See Comm’r of D.C. v. Benenson, 329 A.2d 437, 438–39 (D.C. 1974) (noting the Fine Arts 
Commission’s refusal to permit the owners to deface or alter the hotel because it is a historical 
landmark); Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 153, 154–56 (D.D.C. 1975) 
(discussing the hotel owners’ litigation seeking a permit to demolish certain elements of the ho-
tel). 
 63 Oversight Hearing on Pennsylvania Avenue Development Plan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Nat’l Parks & Recreation of the H. Comm. on Interior & Insular Aff., 94th Cong. 65 (1975) 
(statement of Earnest A. Connally, Assoc. Dir., Prof. Servs., Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of  the Inte-
rior). 
 64 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978). 
 65 Special Comm. on Historic Pres., U.S. Conference of Mayors, Findings and Recommendations, 
in WITH HERITAGE SO RICH 203, 207 (1966). 
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to borrow Justice Rehnquist’s words, some “sort of interest” in the property 
that community members may possess.66 
E.  Problems—But Buildings Still Come Down 
The obvious problem is that despite the great strides that have been 
made since Penn Central, buildings still come down at an alarming rate.67  
Indeed, the individual property owners have an inordinate amount of con-
trol over what happens to these place-making structures.  This is readily 
apparent in properties owned by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, like St. 
Laurentius.68  In 2016, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia instructed parish 
priests not to help in preservation efforts for the church buildings in Phila-
delphia.69  This was undoubtedly motivated by economic rationales, how-
ever, it does put the priests at odds with the communities that they are there 
to serve. If the church really is a place-making community center, should 
not the priest be allowed to fight with the neighborhood to save the church?  
Additionally, if an owner has decided to stand in the way of preserving the-
se significant structures, does not the public, which may have some sort of 
ownership right, need some recourse? 
II.  EVERY SORT OF INTEREST 
Historic Preservation Laws are immune from takings challenges.  How-
ever, buildings still come down.  If there is to be a solution to this found in 
public interest in these community-making places, then there must be a due 
process right that the public has in these sorts of places.  In this Part, I look 
to examples from other areas of law where the court has held that there is 
 
 66 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 67 See, e.g., Bradley Maule, supra note 12 (documenting notable buildings that disappeared in Phil-
adelphia in 2015). 
 68 See Daniel Craig, Archdiocese Signals Pending Battle over Churches’ Historic Designations, 
PHILLY VOICE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/archdiocese-memo-signals-pending-
battle-over-historic-designations/ (“A recent Archdiocese of Philadelphia memo directs parish 
pastors not to get involved with any efforts to designate its churches or properties for historical 
preservation. . . . [T]he archdiocese intends to challenge recent efforts to designate Philadelphia 
churches as historic, including a designation given to . . . the St. Laurentius Church building in 
Fishtown . . . .”). 
 69 Id.; see also Patrick Hildebrandt, New AD Directive Is a Call to Arms, PHILA. CHURCH PROJECT 
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.phillychurchproject.com/project-blog/2016/1/10/new-ad-
announcement-is-a-call-to-arms (noting the Archdiocese’s policy against pastors’ involvement in 
historic preservation of churches); Letter from Daniel J. Kutys, Moderator of the Curia, Archdio-
cese of Phila., to Clergy Members, Archdiocese of Phila. (Jan. 7, 2016) (memorializing the 
Archdiocese’s intent to fight the historic designation of St. Laurentius and several other parishes 
and referencing the Archdiocese’s policy against priests aiding preservationists in designating 
church buildings). 
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some sort of due process right or interest that may be able to be translated 
to a right to historic buildings. 
A.  A Right to Community-Making Places as a Statutorily Created Interest 
1.  Matthews v. Eldridge 
Completely outside the scope of historic preservation law sits Matthews 
v. Eldridge.70  Decided two years before Penn Central, the Court in Mat-
thews held that individuals have a statutorily granted property right in so-
cial security benefits.71  For almost twenty years before his benefits were 
terminated, George Eldridge received benefits under the disability insur-
ance benefits program created by Title II of the Social Security Act.72  El-
dridge challenged the constitutionality of the termination arguing that he 
had a property right in the benefits and that the Due Process Clause man-
dated that he have an evidentiary hearing before termination of those bene-
fits.73  In reaching their conclusion, the Court enumerated three factors to 
consider when determining whether an individual’s interest implicates due 
process, and if so, how much due process is afforded.  The Court held that 
in determining the “specific [procedural] dictates of due process” a court 
must consider “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the offi-
cial action; second, the risk of an erroneous depravation of such interest 
through the procedures used . . . and finally, the Government’s interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens.”74  
The Court went on to further hold that despite the statutorily created prop-
erty interest in social security benefits, Eldridge had been afforded suffi-
cient due process given the balancing test.75 
Incidentally, Justice Brennan dissented in Matthews v. Eldridge.  Jus-
tice Brennan agreed with the district and court of appeals that Eldridge was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the discontinuation of his social 
security benefits.76  In other words, the interest that George Eldridge had in 
the “property” granted him by the Social Security Act was not afforded suf-
ficient due process considerations without the evidentiary hearing. 
 
 70 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 71 Id. at 332 (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which de-
prive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]he interest of an individual in continued receipt of 
[social security] benefits is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
 72 Id. at 323. 
 73 Id. at 325. 
 74 Id. at 335. 
 75 Id. at 349. 
 76 Id. at 349–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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2.  The NHPA as a Right-Creating Statute 
Clearly, the language of the Social Security Act creates a much stronger 
argument for a statutorily created property right than the National Historic 
Preservation Act does.77  However, the National Historic Preservation Act 
(“NHPA”) does say that it is the policy of the federal government to “foster 
conditions under which our modern society and our historic property can 
exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other re-
quirements of present and future generations.”78 
Additionally, Section 106 of the NHPA requires that where there is a 
federal undertaking that affects historic properties (from licensing to own-
ership) the federal agency must study ways to avoid or mitigate any ad-
verse impacts to those property.79  This includes a memorandum of agree-
ment (“MOA”) at the end of the process between the State Historic 
Preservation Office and the agency.80 
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit held owners of historic properties near a de-
velopment did have standing to sue the City of San Francisco under an 
MOA that had been executed between the City of San Francisco, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and the devel-
opers of a large project.81  The court cited contract principles that third par-
ty beneficiaries must show that the contract was made for their direct bene-
fit and that they were an intended beneficiary of the contract.82  Further, the 
court references that the public is a beneficiary of the MOA, a group which 
the homeowners definitely fall into.83  If we are to take the idea that the 
public benefits from historic preservation laws and the preservation of his-
toric places as important, then the public is being deprived of a benefit here 
and could have standing to sue as intended beneficiaries of many of these 
MOAs. 
This suggests, at least mildly, that there is a benefit granted to the pub-
lic by the NHPA and other state historic preservation acts.  When an indi-
vidual or entity (presumably with licensing from a state or federal agency) 
chooses to deprive the public or the community of that benefit by demol-
 
 77 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (2012) (noting that any individual dissatisfied with a 
determination regarding his qualifications for disability benefits is entitled to an evidentiary hear-
ing). 
 78 54 U.S.C. § 300101(1) (2014) (emphasis added).   
 79 Id. § 306108. 
 80 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.5(e)(4). 
 81 Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 82 Id. at 1134–34 (citing Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 83 Tyler, 236 F.3d at 1135; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (suggesting that the general public is the in-
tended beneficiary of the assessment of adverse effects of a federal undertaking for historic prop-
erties). 
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ishing or otherwise abridging it, the public may be entitled to some level of 
due process under the Matthews v. Eldridge framework.84 
B.  A Fundamental Right to Places 
1.  United States v. Gettysburg 
Arguably, the beginning of historic preservation law, United States v. 
Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., is a cloyingly patriotic example of public 
benefit over individual rights.85  In the nineteenth century, preservation was 
marked with a focus on inspiring the population to be better people.86  In 
the late nineteenth century, the government wanted to condemn the Gettys-
burg Battlefield for the purpose of creating a national park.87  The question 
arose whether or not this was a legitimate public purpose.  Justice Rufus 
Peckham’s majority opinion suggests that there can be no greater public 
purpose than the preservation of this battlefield.88 
Importantly though, as Carol Rose pointed out, Justice Peckham’s opin-
ion understands that “a place can convey this sense of community, or more 
generally, that visual surroundings work a political effect on our con-
sciousness.”89  Gettysburg, independent of its extreme political and social 
importance, stands for the proposition that places matter and that the public 
stands to benefit from them. 
2.  Communities as Fundamental 
All historic properties are not Gettysburg.  Gettysburg’s importance 
was eloquently stated by Justice Peckham in 1896: 
Their successful effort to preserve the integrity and solidarity of the great re-
public of modern times is forcibly impressed upon every one who looks over 
the field. . . . . [The preservation of the battlefield] touches the heart, and comes 
home to the imagination of every citizen, and greatly tends to enhance his love 
and respect for those institutions for which these heroic sacrifices were made.  
The greater the love of the citizen for the institutions of his country, the greater 
 
 84 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 85 160 U.S. 668 (1896). 
 86 Rose, supra note 13, at 481 (“The nineteenth century inspirational view of preservation was 
marked by an interest in civic education intended from the outset to have important political ram-
ifications.”). 
 87 Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 670. 
 88 Id. at 681–82 (“The battle of Gettysburg was one of the great battles of the world. . . . The exist-
ence of the government itself and the perpetuity of our institutions depended on the re-
sult. . . . Such a use seems necessarily not only a public use, but one so closely connected with 
the welfare of the republic itself as to be within the powers granted Congress . . . for the purpose 
of . . . preserving the whole country.”). 
 89 Rose, supra note 13, at 483 (emphasis omitted). 
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is the dependence properly to be placed upon him for their defense in time of 
necessity, and it is to such men that the country must look for its safety.  The 
institutions of our country, which were saved at this enormous expenditure of 
life and property, ought to and will be regarded with proportionate affection.  
Here upon this battlefield is one of the proofs of that expenditure, and the sacri-
fices are rendered more obvious and more easily appreciated when such a bat-
tlefield is preserved by the government at the public expense.90 
It may not be that all historic properties are of the importance on a national 
scale as Gettysburg, but are similar sentiments not true of communities and 
neighborhoods?  The right to a community seems almost fundamental.  
Fundamental rights under the due process clause are those that are “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty”91 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s histo-
ry and tradition.”92 
On a much smaller scale, it may seem that there is a due process right to 
community and as a result community-building spaces that arises out of our 
conception of liberty and traditions.  Individual neighborhoods and a sense 
of home are embedded in the American psyche.93  Home is an explicitly 
protected concept in American law.94  That idea may well be extended to 
the neighborhood and the intangibles from the exterior that make a house a 
home.95 
C.  The Right of Cities to Be Beautiful 
1.  Berman v. Parker 
One of the foundational cases in land use and historic preservation law 
is Berman v. Parker.96  In Berman, the property owner appealed a decision 
of the District Court for the District of Columbia that held it was not an un-
constitutional taking for the city to “condemn property only for the reason-
 
 90 Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 682–83. 
 91 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937). 
 92 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 93 Ronald E. Wilson, Why Neighborhoods Matter: The Importance of Geographic Composition, 2 
GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY (2009) (“Neighborhoods are the places where the everyday practice 
of life occurs.  They are geographical units that are essential to people’s lives—people connect 
these living environments to their identity and, thus, neighborhoods become personally meaning-
ful.”) (footnote omitted). 
 94 D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006) (discuss-
ing generally, how homes are more favored under the law than are other forms of property, in-
cluding overt protections under the Third and Fourth Amendments). 
 95 See id. at 255 (noting the cliché “a house is not a home” implicates the cultural contruct of 
“home” as evocative of sentimental values beyond the the physical structure); Katherine Levine 
Einstein & David M. Glick, Model Neighborhoods Through Mayor’s Eyes Fifty Years After the 
Civil Rights Act, 95 B.U. L. REV. 873, 875 (2015) (discussing the important impact of neighbor-
hoods, especially racially segregated neighborhoods, on individuals’ lives). 
 96 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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able necessities of slum clearance and prevention, its concept of ‘slum’ be-
ing the existence of conditions ‘injurious to the public health, safety, mor-
als and welfare.’”97 
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the district court’s ruling, al-
beit with modifications.  Justice William Douglas, writing for the Court, 
wrote that “[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more 
than spread disease and crime and immorality.  They may also suffocate the 
spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle.  They 
may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden.”98  He continued 
that “[poor housing conditions] may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the 
community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men 
turn.  The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer 
may ruin a river.”99  Justice Douglas felt so strongly about the importance 
of healthful and beautiful communities that he broadened the district 
court’s conception of what may be constitutionally condemned: “We think 
the standards prescribed were adequate for executing the plan to eliminate 
not only slums as narrowly defined by the district court but also the blight-
ed areas that tend to produce slums.  Property may of course be taken for 
this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffend-
ing.”100  Walter Muir Whitehill later wrote of Justice Douglas’s opinion 
that “[a] 1954 United States Supreme Court decision (Berman vs Parker) 
ruled that a city has as much right to be beautiful as it has to be safe and 
clean.”101 
2. The Right of People to Beautiful Communities 
Eminent domain and potentially problematic considerations aside,102 
Justice Douglas’s opinion stands for the proposition that cities (and by ex-
tension communities) have a right to be beautiful as well as safe and 
 
 97 Id. at 28, 31. 
 98 Id. at 32. 
 99 Id. at 32–33. 
100 Id. at 35. 
101 Walter Muir Whitehill, The Right of Cities to Be Beautiful, in WITH HERITAGE SO RICH 45, 45 
(1966). 
102 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–84 (2005) (expanding the reasoning of 
Berman regarding what constitutes a public use for eminent domain analysis, and holding that 
the City of New London could condemn an entire neighborhood for economic gains); Wendell E. 
Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Do-
main, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 46 (2003) (“Douglas’s opinion in Berman reflects a faith in 
the political system’s ability to operate in a non-discriminatory manner.  Urban renewal, howev-
er, was an economic development program with profound racial implications that were ignored 
by all the parties to the litigation.”) (footnote omitted). 
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clean.103  Gerald E. Frug argued in 1980 that cities need to be given more 
power in order to achieve true “public freedom.”104  It is people, however, 
who make up cities.  If the benefits that Justice Douglas mentioned in Ber-
man are to be fully realized, beautiful cities that are helpful to the public 
welfare and education, then the idea needs to be reconceived from the city 
writ large having a right to be beautiful to the individuals having a right to 
beautiful neighborhoods and beautiful communities.  Further, this recasting 
as a smaller entity from Justice Douglas’s original idea helps to avoid the 
problem that is articulated by Wendell Pritchett in his article, “The ‘Public 
Menace’ of Blight.”105  In his article, Pritchett notes that while Justice 
Douglas’s intentions may have been good, the application of the principle 
in Berman has largely been to shape the racial demographic of cities and to 
push racial minorities into other areas.106  If the right of cities to be beauti-
ful is recast as a right of individuals to beautiful cities (or communities), 
then the decisions are no longer being made from on high and the risk of 
discriminatory action by decision-makers is avoided. 
III.  STANDING 
The question ultimately comes down to whether or not that interest is 
important enough for a court to recognize that the individual is sufficiently 
interested in the controversy to bring the claim.  This is called the standing 
requirement.107  In the wake of the National Historic Preservation Act, 
courts created two major categories of parties who had sufficient standing 
to bring a lawsuit.  This was based in a pseudo-equitable doctrine intended 
to avoid inquiry into the injury that the party had suffered.  In the ensuing 
decades, these two buckets of parties who can bring lawsuits have re-
mained largely unchanged; however, courts have dropped the pseudo-
equitable explanation and instead undergo traditional standing analysis to 
reach the same conclusion.  This Part explores this inconstancy in the 
court’s treatment of standing analysis in historic preservation cases from 
the 1960s to present and argues that the difference is largely in the jurist’s 
conception of the injury in question and the underlying interest that the par-
ty may have in community-making structures.  This Part goes on to con-
clude that under the Supreme Court’s current conception of standing in his-
toric preservation cases, the old buckets of individuals who are able to 
 
103 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
104 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). 
105 Pritchett, supra note 102. 
106 Id. at 47. 
107 See Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A party’s right to make a legal claim 
or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”). 
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bring claims should be abandoned in favor or more inclusive opportunities 
for parties and interested groups to save their community-making struc-
tures. 
In order to even get in the door, a plaintiff must allege that she has suf-
fered an injury in fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to the action of the 
defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion.108  This injury in fact must be “an invasion of a legally protected in-
terest” that is both “concrete” and “particularized.”109  To summarize in 
historic preservation terms, in order to show that the party has a sufficient 
interest in order to file a lawsuit related to the demolition or alteration of a 
historic or community-making property, the proposed plaintiff or interve-
nor must allege that she has a legally protected interest in the historic prop-
erty that is real and specific to that property.  Further, she must allege that 
the actions of the defendant, usually the title-holder, are causing an injury 
to that interest and that there is a mechanism by which the courts can recti-
fy the situation.  For purposes of this Part, assume that the proposed plain-
tiff in a case can show to the satisfaction of the court that the injury is 
traceable to the defendant and that the injury will be redressed by a favora-
ble decision.110 
In the years following the passage of the National Historic Preservation 
Act,111 courts relied on the “private attorney general” doctrine to deal with 
the issue of standing in cases arising out of the demolition or alteration of 
historic structures.112  Under the private attorney general doctrine, standing 
is provided for in historic preservation lawsuits under two circumstances: 
“(1) when the plaintiffs are citizens of the area and their direct interests are 
to be affected, and (2) when the group seeking to represent the citizens has 
been actively engaged in the administrative process and has thereby shown 
 
108 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
109 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
110 For example, assume that the local community and the preservation community wanted to get a 
temporary restraining order against the owner of a landmark, but not designated, church who de-
sires to bulldoze the church in order to build a mixed-use development.  In this case, the offend-
ing action is easily traceable to the defendant and there is a commonly used tool at the court’s 
disposal to stop the act.  The question that remains is whether or not any of the interested parties 
have a sufficient interest that will be injured in order to have legal standing.  See, e.g., Ryan 
Briggs, Fishtown Residents Push Back Against Planned Church Demolition, HIDDEN CITY 
PHILA. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://hiddencityphila.org/2016/02/fishtown-residents-push-back-against-
planned-church-demolition/ (describing a situation similar to the proposed working hypothetical 
surrounding the former East Montgomery African Methodist Episcopal Church in the Fishtown 
section of Philadelphia). 
111 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101-307108 (2014). 
112 See South Hill Neighborhood Ass’n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454, 461 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 1025 (1970) (describing the use of the private attorney general doctrine in a suit arising 
out of the demolition of historic buildings in connection with an urban renewal project). 
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a special interest in the area of the controversy.”113  The idea here is that 
plaintiffs’ standing is based on the ground that they are suing as representa-
tives of the general public and that the action is a public action in which the 
plaintiffs are affected no differently than any other people.114  For example, 
in South Hill Neighborhood Association v. Romney, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the private attorney general doctrine provides for standing in the two 
extremely limited circumstances.115  In South Hill, plaintiffs sought to en-
join developers from demolishing fourteen historic buildings as part of an 
urban renewal program.116  The court said explicitly that: 
[I]t is . . . clear that none of the plaintiffs have any real interest in this litigation.  
None of the plaintiffs own or have owned any of the . . . buildings in controver-
sy.  None of the plaintiffs had legal control or title to the buildings when they 
were placed on the National Register. . . . None of the plaintiffs . . . submitted a 
proposal for development of the area.117   
Even while acknowledging the private attorney general doctrine, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the lack of a legal interest barred any of the plain-
tiffs from having standing given the circumstances.118 
Other courts in the late 1960s espoused the same idea—that there is no 
legal interest in community-making places—that was articulated in South 
Hill.  For example, Judge Joseph Smith of the Second Circuit wrote in 1968 
that the personal interest that an individual may have in demolished struc-
tures is not enough to create a legal interest.119  Judge Smith wrote, “Even 
where a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of a case, he may be 
denied standing to sue on the ground that the right which he is attempting 
to assert is not one which the courts will recognize.”120  Judge Smith did 
ultimately hold that the interest of the plaintiffs in Norwalk CORE was sub-
 
113 Id. (citations omitted). 
114 See Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(holding that petitioners had sufficient economic interest to establish standing). See also Scenic 
Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curi-
am)(finding sufficient economic and statutory injuries to establish standing); John W. Vardaman, 
Jr., Standing to Sue in Historic Preservation Cases, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 406, 410 (1971) 
(questioning whether representatives of the listening public had standing in a license renewal 
proceeding). 
115 South Hill Neighborhood Ass’n, 421 F.2d at 461. 
116 Id. at 457–58.  Additionally, it is worth noting that seven of the buildings in question were listed 
on the National Register of Historic Places. 
117 Id. at 460. 
118 Id. at 456, 461. 
119 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). 
120 Id. at 927. 
Mar. 2017] EVERY SORT OF INTEREST 787 
 
stantial and immediate enough that the plaintiffs did have standing to pro-
ceed.121 
In 1971, John W. Vardaman, Jr. wrote that the rationale for the private 
attorney general doctrine was that the injury to the individual or organiza-
tion was too nebulous to hold up to traditional standing tests.122  Vardaman 
based his analysis on the five years of litigation immediately subsequent to 
the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act.  As Vardaman wrote, 
“[P]laintiffs are frequently not able to assert proprietary or economic inter-
ests to give them standing and may be unable to identify any specific indi-
vidualized injury except in the most remote fashion.”123  In other words, 
because only a title-holder has a sufficient proprietary or economic interest 
in the property to suffer a traditionally cognizable injury, courts have had to 
develop a quasi-equitable standing doctrine to allow other parties to get in 
the door.  Vardaman continued by making a comparison to wildlife protec-
tion statutes, saying that it may be a strain to say that any individual or 
group is harmed by the destruction of a particular species but through legis-
lation there has been a congressional determination that there is a public 
interest in the preservation of wildlife species.124 
Generally speaking, equitable standing doctrines have become disfa-
vored in American jurisprudence.125  Courts, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court, began to question whether or not standing doctrines that are not 
firmly rooted in the traditional constitutional analysis were permissible.126 
This is reflected in the body of Historic Preservation cases as well.  In the 
 
121 Id. (“[The plaintiffs’] stake in the outcome of the case is immediate and personal, and the right 
which they allege has been violated—the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination in 
government programs—is one which the courts will protect.  Their standing to sue is clear”). 
122 Vardaman, supra note 114, at 410. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a Comeback?: 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213 
(2015) (discussing the decline of the zone of interests test and the generalized grievances doc-
trine leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark International, which some scholars 
think has effectively ended third-party lawsuits); see also Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 (2014) (Scalia, J.) (holding that a direct application of 
the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement supplies the limits on those who 
may sue for false advertising under the Lanham Act); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing 
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) 
(questioning whether any prudential standing principles not based on constitutional standing are 
valid, and arguing that the lack of basis in firm constitutional standing doctrine calls into ques-
tion the authority of the court to make decisions). 
126 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (affirming the general rule 
against federal taxpayer standing and denying a broad reading of an exception to that rule); see 
also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011) (“For the federal courts 
to decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would be inimical to the 
Constitution’s democratic character.”). 
788 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
twenty-first century, courts began to abandon the private attorney general 
doctrine in favor of the traditional Article III standing analysis articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Lujan.127  Indeed, since the 1970s, a variety of in-
juries have been recognized by federal and state courts as sufficient to es-
tablish injury in fact for standing purposes.  Functionally, this has not ex-
panded the limited scope of the private attorney general doctrine.128  These 
injuries are often asserted without solid basis in some sort of economic or 
proprietary interest.  For example, in Committee to Save the Fox Building v. 
Birmingham Branch of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the court held that 
the injury in fact requirement is satisfied by a showing of harm to the aes-
thetic and environmental well being of the plaintiff and then moved past 
the standing argument.129  Courts have also held more explicitly that injury 
to the aesthetic, architectural, cultural, environmental, or historic values can 
constitute sufficient injury to warrant standing.130 
In order for there to be an injury, the plaintiff must have an interest in 
something that is concrete and particularized that can be injured.131  Courts, 
however, have skipped over this critical step and have determined that 
 
127 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61; see also supra 108–109.  Lujan has been cited 
as the proper analysis for standing in many historic preservation cases in recent years.  See, e.g., 
Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 467–68 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that residents living near the 
site of a road being constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers had standing to sue and had suf-
fered a sufficient injury in fact under a rigorous Lujan analysis); Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ 
Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying the Lujan formulation of the 
standing analysis to determine that Philadelphia residents had standing to challenge a proposed 
urban renewal project).  
128 It is worth noting that other scholars have noted the seemingly arbitrary switch between constitu-
tional and prudential standing doctrines.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to 
Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990) (arguing that the Court’s distinction between 
prudential and constitutional standing doctrines is often arbitrary). 
129 Comm. to Save the Fox Bldg. v. Birmingham Branch of Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 497 F. 
Supp. 504, 509 (N.D. Ala. 1980). 
130 See, e.g., Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway & Bridge Comm. v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 784, 787 
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that demolishing a historic structure is sufficient injury to establish 
standing); Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23–24 
(6th Cir. 1980) (holding that injury to aesthetic value constitutes sufficient injury in factor for 
standing); Hall Cty. Historical Soc’y v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741, 747 (N.D. 
Ga. 1978) (holding that injury to environmental concerns is sufficient); Weintraub v. Rural Elec. 
Admin., 457 F. Supp. 78, 88 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that injury to architectural heritage is suf-
ficient). 
131 The Lujan Court noted that particularly in suits against the government, the injury requirement is 
of the utmost importance.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[O]ur cases 
have established that the irreducable constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.  
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is (a) concrete and particularlized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or  
“hypothetical.”’”) (citations omitted); Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. 
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“[T]he concept of standing is a practical and func-
tional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate 
in a proceeding . . . .”). 
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there is an injury without an interest.  This means that there must be some 
implicit interest that an individual in the zone of interest and/or an organi-
zation that has been involved in the process has in order to establish an in-
jury in-fact.  To put it another way, Vardaman articulated the rationale for 
the private attorney general doctrine as allowing plaintiffs to proceed on 
claims because there was no proprietary or economic interest or where that 
interest was too nebulous or remote for the plaintiff to be able to plausibly 
allege some sort of interest in fact.132  In abandoning the private attorney 
general doctrine in favor of a traditional analysis under Lujan, courts are 
functionally saying that it is no longer necessary to create the legal fiction 
of an interest that necessitated the private attorney general doctrine.  In 
fact, the underlying assumption that comes from these cases is that there is 
not an interest, proprietary or economic, that an individual or involved not-
for-profit organization has in community-making structures. 
 There are numerous ways in which an individual has a relation to com-
munity-making structures and therefore has a proprietary interest in 
them.133  Additionally, organizations and individual business owners may 
have an economic interest in the community-making structures in their 
community.134  If were are to take these proprietary and economic interests 
seriously, then for purposes of standing we should never have needed to get 
to the private attorney general doctrine or other pseudo-equitable standing 
doctrines (for example, prudential standing) in order for affected plaintiffs 
to be able to bring lawsuits to preserve historic buildings.  By recognizing 
these property interests we can further recognize concrete and particular-
ized injury in fact to a very real interest that is far from the nebulous and 
remote interest described by Vardaman. 
As courts have done away with the private attorney general doctrine in 
favor of a more traditional Article III standing analysis, it is time to remove 
the categorical barriers to standing that have persisted in the jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Is it farfetched to say that individual community members may have a 
property right in their community-making places that would supersede that 
of the title-holder?  Very possibly.  However, it is clear that the jurispru-
 
132 Vardaman, supra note 114, at 410. 
133 See generally JACOBS, supra note 59 (discussing the importance of structures to community life); 
NEWMAN, supra note 59 (discussing the effect of architecture on crime rates in urban areas). 
134 See DONOVAN RYPKEMA ET AL., PLACEECONOMICS, MEASURING ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
(2d ed. 2013), http://www.achp.gov/docs/Economic%20Impacts%20v5-FINAL.pdf (citing nu-
merous sources measuring the value of the economic impact historic preservation has on com-
munities). 
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dence from Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Breitel, Justice Peckham, and 
Justice Douglas contemplates some sort of interest that the community has 
in its historic buildings.  If we are to take Justice Rehnquist at his word, 
that property in the Constitution is meant to encompass “every sort of in-
terest” that an individual may have in property and to take into account the 
person’s relationship with the thing135 then we clearly need to recognize 
that there is an underlying due-process-worthy property right in historic 
structures. 
Of course, this Comment has blinders on with respect to the obvious re-
alities of old buildings in the real world.  Buildings inevitably deteriorate 
and become expensive to maintain even with the best maintenance.  Histor-
ic preservation is inherently an expensive endeavor.136  However, there are 
numerous studies that show the economic benefits of preservation, includ-
ing individual instances where economic hardship arguments proved to be 
completely counter to the reality of the situation.137 
The Archdiocese of Philadelphia may have legal title to the Church of 
St. Laurentius.  The parishioners, however, and the community members at 
large, are the ones who were married and baptized there, educated there, 
and grew up there.  The community members are the ones who going to 
have to look at the empty lot if the Archdiocese were to leave and the 
community is the one who would lose the structure that gave them a sense 
of place for almost a century.  When the wrecking ball pulls up to a struc-
ture like that, whose ownership interest should we be protecting? 
	
 
135 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). 
136 See, e.g., Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 924–25 (D.D.C. 1996) (hold-
ing that despite the expense associated with maintaining a large historic property, property owner 
could not simply allow historic properties to fall into disrepair). 
137 See, e.g., RYPKEMA ET AL., supra note 134, at vi (providing data showing the economic benefits 
of preservation). 
